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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN D. CALDWELL,
APPELLANT,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

vs.
Court of Appeals
Docket No. 970239-CA
LAUREL W. CALDWELL AND
NELDA WALL,
APPELLEES,
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The parties to this appeal are the appellant Stephen D. Caldwell and the appellees Laurel
W. Caldwell and Nelda Wall. Appellant has argued that the plaintiff Laura W. Caldwell is not a
party to this appeal because the lower court dismissed a judgment for child support in her favor as
duplicitous of a judgment in the divorce action and she has not taken an appeal. However, Mrs.
Caldwell is an interested party in the judgment that is the subject matter of this appeal as is
admitted by the appellant. The judgment could well have been renewed in her name and should
be so renewed should the Courtfindthe judgment is inappropriately issued in the name of Nelda
Wall.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to the provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j),
Utah Code and the order of the Supreme Court dated April 8,1997 which transferred the case to
this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Summons and Complaint were duly served by leaving them with his wife
at his usual place of abode and whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain appellant's motion
to vacate the default judgment.
2. Whether the issuance of the default judgment in the name of Nelda Wall, the surviving
spouse of Hal E. Wall, was inappropriate.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Laurel W. Caldwell was divorcedfromthe defendant Stephen D. Caldwell in
January 1993. The decree ordered the defendant to pay a portion of a second mortgage in the
name of Hal E. Wall in the amount of $10,069.00. The defendant (appellant here) moved out of
state sometime after the divorce. The defendant has not paid anything toward the judgment of
$10,069. The defendant Hal E. Wall was deceased at the time the plaintiff Laurel Caldwell
brought an action to renew the judgment. The action included the estate of Hal E. Wall as a party
plaintiff. Service of the Summons and Complaint were affected upon the defendant by serving
them upon defendant's wife, Nikki Caldwell at defendant's residence and place of abode in
Appleton Missouri by a deputy sheriff of the county. Default judgment was taken against the
defendant in February 1993 and notice of default was mailed to the defendant at his Appleton
Missouri, residence.
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In 1996 the defendant was found employed in the State of Utah and a garnishment was
issued to collect on the judgment. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss to dismiss the default
judgment which was denied below.
Appellant Steven D. Caldwell seeks to overturn the decision of the district court denying
his motion to vacate or set aside the default judgment which renews the judgment in the Decree of
Divorce that he pay a portion of the second mortgage on the parties9 home in the amount of
$10,069.00.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The defendant was duly served with the Summons and Complaint at his usual place of
abode in Appleton Missouri by having a deputy sheriff of the county serve them upon his wife.
The defendant's argument that he was residing in awayfromthe home at the time for employment
in Amarillo Texas is unavailing. The appellant continually ignored the process of the Court in the
underlying divorce case and misled the Court and the plaintiff with regard to their ownership
interests in the family residence at the time of the divorce. His claim that he did not receive notice
of the action by the service upon his wife is self serving and should be given no credence in view
lack of veracity and his previous history of bad faith in not responding to the Court's notices and
orders. The defendant lived with his wife prior to going out of state for temporary employment.
He returned to live with his wife and family during breaks in his employment for at leastfivedays
in each three week period. His temporary absence for employment did not change his usual place
of abode and the service was proper. Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 Pac. 931 (1910).
2. The appellant's failure to respond to the Summons and Complaint and actively litigate
the issues as well as prosecute a timely appeal deprives the Court ofjurisdiction to entertain his
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motion to vacate the judgment. The default judgment is res judicata.
3. Whether or not the Court affirms or reverses the denial by the trial Court to set aside
the default judgment, there is a lack ofjurisdiction to further entertain the other arguments raised
by the appellant in his brief on appeal. Nevertheless, the issuance of a judgment in the name of
Nelda Wall, the surviving spouse of Hal E. Wall, is not so substantively defective as to warrant a
reversal of the lower Court's order. The defendant cannot come to the Court seeking equity
when he has so blatantly ignored the processes of the Court and avoided the affect of its orders
for so many years. The time for the defendant to prevent any defects in either the pleadings or the
renewal of the judgment is long past. The practicalities of the situation do not ofifend either equity
or due process. Had the judgment been renewed in the name of the plaintiff, Laurel W. Caldwell,
she could have assigned it to Nelda Wall and the affect would have been the same.
FACTS
1. The facts and issues in this appeal are simple. The Decree of Divorce between the
appellant and his former spouse, Laurel W. Caldwell, one of the appellees here, adjudged that he
should pay a portion of the second mortgage on the parties home to his father-in law, Hal E. Wall
in the amount of $10,069.00 and ordered him to do so. Some time after the divorce, the appellant
movedfromthe State of Utah. (Appl. Appendix D) He took full advantage of his being out of
the state to avoid further process in the divorce action. He paid child support only when his
employment out of the state was discovered by his former spouse or the State office of Recovery
Services and the support was withheld from his wages. (Dkt Pg. 123-128) He never at any time
notified the his former spouse of his changes of address or employment. Although he was
required to keep the court below informed of his changes of address he never did so.
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2. All attempts by Mrs. Caldwell to obtain process through the divorce court for
contempt for failure to pay child support and to have support arrearages and unpaid medical
expenses reduced to judgment and to discover his current income, werefrustratedand fraught
with delay. (The lower court was referred to the earlier proceedings in the Divorce Action,
Caldwell v. Caldwell, C82-1586; See Dkt page 219).

He simply refused to appear at several

hearings scheduled by the divorce court and to respond to discovery ordered. He never paid a
penny toward the $10,069.00 he was ordered to pay in the Decree.
3. In 1990, just prior to the expiration of the eight year statute of limitations on
judgments, an action was filed to renew the judgments for child support and the payment of the
$10,069.00 portion of the second mortgage. (See Appl. Admission Brf. Page 7) Service of
process was never obtained upon Mr. Caldwell within the required 120 days and the case was
dismissed in June of 1991. A new action to renew the judgment was filed in June of 1992, prior
to the running of the one year statute of limitations. (Dkt page 1). Mr. Caldwell was duly served
with process at his residence in Appleton, Missouri by serving his spouse, Nikki Caldwell in
September 1992. (Dkt page 6). The return of service filed with the court below shows that the
date and time of service as well as the name of the deputy sheriff serving them upon the
appellant's wife all in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. True to his
form and practice of ignoring appearances and other process in the divorce action because he was
out side of the state, he ignored the service of process and did not respond to the summons or
answer the complaint. And a default judgment was taken. (Dkt. Page 13) Notice of the default
judgment was served upon him by mail to his residence in Appleton, Missouri which he also
ignored. (Dkt page 15). He did not respond until he was caught in the State of Utah in the
-4-

summer of 1996 and his wages were garnished to partially satisfy the judgment. (Dkt. Page 1726) He then responded with the self serving claim that he was not served with the summons and
the complaint and had no notice of the action. (Dkt page 27). He further attacked the judgment
on several other grounds which he should have raised by a timely defense in the action, some of
which he raises in this appeal. The trial judge below denied his motion to ruled that he was duly
served with the summons and complaint, that he failed to respond and denied his motion to vacate
or set aside the default judgment.

ARGUMENT
L Preliminary Statement
To prevail in this appeal the appellant must overcome a giant hurdle which he did not
overcome below: the establishing that he was not duly and personally served with the summons
and complaint. If Mr. Wall was duly served with process he did no invoke the powers of the court
in a timely manner. The default judgment wasfinaljudgmentfromwhich he failed tofilea timely
appeal and it is now res judicata. The court lacks jurisdiction to entertain his motion to dismiss.
Wisden v. Bangerter,

P.2d

, 260 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, (1995) Absent unusual and

circumstances requiring the entertainment in the interests of substantial justice of his motion under
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Rules of procedure there is no remedy available to him.
Certainly if the equities in the case are considered he cannot claim that he has come to
court with clean hands after dodging the judgment and ignoring the processes of the court in the
underlying divorce proceeding for nearly 15 years as well ignoring the service of process in this
action. Conversely if appellant's argument is correct and he was not duly served with service of
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process, the remainder of his arguments are superfluous. If the judgment is void for want of
service of process the court lacks jurisdiction and there is no need for further argument of the
subject.
This is really and simply a case of Mr. Caldwell being caught within the state where the
plaintiffs could practicably and economically force him to face the process and poser of the court.
n. Mr. Caldwell Was Duly and Personally Served With Process.
a. Standard of Review
This Court ordinarily reviews a denial of the court below to set aside a default judgment
for abuse of discretion. Where the issue is lack ofjurisdiction the trial court has no discretion and
its ruling is reviewed for correctness. State v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989) However,
findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The trial court is given no
deference to its conclusions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Eskelsen v. Perry, 819
P.2d 770 (Utah 1991) The determination or conclusion of the trial court below that the plaintiffs
properly complied with the requirements of Rule 4 in serving the defendant may be reviewed for
correctness, but underlying and implicit in that ruling and determination is a factual finding that
the summons and complaint were left at Mr. Caldwell's usual place of abode with a person of
suitable age and discretion, his wife Nikki Caldwell. To overturn the lower court'sfindingthe
appellant must show thefindingwas clearly erroneous.
b. Process Was Served Upon the Appellant at His Dwelling House or Usual Place
of Abode.
The service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant by having a deputy sheriff
of the county in leave them at his residence with a person of suitable age and discretion, his wife,
-6-

fully complies with the requirements of Rule 4(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is
defined in the Rule as personal service. Mr. Caldwell's own self serving denial that he never
received them is unavailing. If the courts were to accept such denials the service of process in
thousands of cases would be for naught and the provision in the Rule that personal service may be
effected by leaving the summons and complaint at the residence of the defendant with a person of
suitable age and discretion would mean nothing. This is particularly so as in this case where the
defendant has the ability to bring forth evidence and the statement of his wife to corroborate his
statement and fails to do so. He alone is in possession and control of the facts of what happened
after the service of process. His self serving statement that he did not receive notice is not enough
particularly in view of his previous record for ignoring the processes of the divorce court and his
demonstrated lack of veracity therein.
Mr. Caldwell argues that he was working on a job in Amarillo, Texas at the time and only
returning to his home about every three weeks for five days. He thus argues that his residence in
Appleton, Missouri was not his usual place of abode and Service upon his wife at that place was
not valid service upon him. Even absent its self serving nature, his affidavit does not overcome
the facts that he was permanently living and residing at his home in Missouri and that it was
residence and his usual place of abode. Further, Mr. Caldwell did not bring submit any other
evidence, such as a sworn statement of his wife, to corroborate his story. He does not say how
temporary the job in Amarillo was or how long the job lasted. Peoplefrequentlywork away from
their home and reside near their work on a temporary basis. Their permanent home is considered
to be their residence and usual place of abode at the time. It is the one place where they have
stability. Moreover, Since he is the person who is in possession of the facts and married to the
-7-

person with whom process was left, the court could well infer that if it would not have been
favorable to him or he would have done so.
Further, after the entry of the default judgment, counsel for the plaintiff on February 20,
1993, mailed a Notice of Entry Of Judgment to Mr. Caldwell at his permanent address in
Appleton, Missouri. Mr. Caldwell did nothing after the Notice was mailed.
Mr. Caldwell argues that the appellees did nothing to overcome his statement that he was
living awayfromhome at the time. To the contrary, Mrs. Laurel Caldwell, his former spouse,
stated in her affidavit in opposition to his motion to vacate that she had numerous communications with him in and around time the summons and complaint were served upon him and had
knowledge that he was residing at the Appleton, Missouri address at the time he was served. In
addition to this sworn statement Mrs. Caldwell provided detail of a visit to Missouri with her
children In May of 1992, just a few months before the service was made. She observed him at that
address having a barbeque with his children and friends. She was invited by him to attend the
family function (barbeque) which she declined. (File p. 123,fflf3, 5-8)
Mrs. Caldwell further provided detailed sworn statements of his dishonesty in the divorce
proceedings where he allowed the divorce court and her to erroneously believe that he and the
plaintiff owned their home and allocate the equity and indebtedness thereon when in fact he knew
of two civil actions against them for collection of business debts which he kept from the plaintiff.
He knew at the time of the divorce that their interests in the home had been sold at a sheriffs sale
and that they legally owned no interest in the home at all at the time. (Id. ffl| 11-12, there are two
Us designated 11; Dec. 13, 1996 Hg transcript p 8, Dkt p 219) Mr. Caldwell submitted nothing to
rebut the statements in her affidavit, but argued only that they were irrelevant. (Transcript of Dec.
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13,1996 Hearing on Motion to Vacate, pp 5-6, Docket pp 216-217)
She further pointed out to the Court his lack of cooperation and his indifference to the
processes of the court in the underlying divorce action of which the trial judge could take judicial
notice. He never advised the court of his changes of address as he was obligated to do. He did
not appear at several hearings relative to orders to show cause and a petition to modify the decree
and did not respond to discovery requests of the plaintiff and the order of the divorce court
compelling discovery. (Affidavit, f 10, Docket p 125) He took full advantage of his absence from
the State of Utah to avoid paying child support, medical expenses and only did so when Mrs.
Caldwell and Recovery Services tracked him down and had support withheld from his pay. He
totally ignored and refused to pay anything on the judgment of $10,069.00 in the Decree of
Divorce. His temporary absencesfromhis family and home for work in varying locations did not
change his usual place of abode. Counsel's argument that he is working out of state for weeks at
a time is an admission that his out of state work is temporary. (Dec. 13. 1996 Hg Transcript, p 6,
Dktp217)
Whether or not the service under rule 4 was good does not depend upon absolute proof
that the defendant actually received the summons and complaint. Rule 4 only requires that the
moving party follow the requirements of the Rule and make reasonable efforts to serve process
upon the defendant, not that it exhaust all possibilities. The burden of showing he was not
properly served then shifts to the defendant. (In re Schwenke, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 23 (1993)
The Schwenke case involved service of a summons and complaint for disciplinary proceedings by
the Utah State Bar. The respondent did not file an answer and default judgment was entered
against him. The respondent later claimed not to have received service which was sent to him at
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the address of his office where he was known to be doing business. Several months later the Bar
gave the respondent notice of a disciplinary hearing and eventually caused a new summons and
the complaint to be served upon him. On appeal from a default judgment issued as a result of not
filing a timely answer to the second summons and complaint the Utah Supreme Court addressed
the validity of service offirstcomplaint. The Supreme Court, citing Downey State Bank v.
Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976) stated:
We have previously observed that under the more stringent
requirements of service of process under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4,
it is not required that a plaintiff exhaust all possibilities as a means of
finding and serving a defendant, only that the plaintiff exercise reasonable
diligence in good faith.
In the instant case, perfectly reasonable means were employed. The summons and
complaint were personally delivered to the defendant's wife at the address of his current residence
in full compliance with Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah
1976)
The defendant cites several cases which he argues support his claim that service under
URCP 4. His cases are inapposite. In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) the court
affirmed a setting aside of a decree of divorce for lack of service of process upon the defendant by
leaving it with prison authorities where the defendant was at the time of service. However, the
reason service was not effective was not because the prison was not the defendant's usual place
of abode at the time, but because the person with whom it was left did not reside at the prison as
specified in the Rule. Supreme Court explicitly noted:
Service was not made under this provision since the summons was left
with a prison officer who clearly did not reside at appellant's usual
place of abode. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290 (footnote omitted)
It also appears the Court was chagrined because the summons could have easily been left with the
defendant himself. Such is not the situation in this case. The appellant was admittedly tempo-10-

temporarily working out of town.
Service was held to be defective in Woody v. Rhodes, 461. P.2d 465 cited by appellant
because the return of service was defective. The deputy sheriff left the process with the
defendant's wife, but on the return showed the service to have been made on the brother of the
defendant who was not a party to the action.
In Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah 450,108 Pac. 931 (1910), service left with a wife of the
defendant was not effective because the defendant was living in Liverpool, England for two years
at the time and the home in which the wife was living had been built by her after the defendant
moved to England. The defendant had never lived in the home and it was conceded that the
defendant had no knowledge of the judgment at the time it was entered and until over a year later
when he returnedfromEngland. Appellant here, in lifting languagefromthe Grant opinion omits
to quote pertinent statements of the Court's:
. . . It may be accepted that as a general rule a man's place of abode,
prima facie at least, is presumed to be where his family lives. "This
presumption, however, is one of fact and not of law, and may be overcome
by evidence showing the facts to be otherwise." Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah
450,
, 108 Pac. 931, 933 (1910) (citations omitted)
The Grant Court further noted:
If the Court had found that at the time respondent went to England he was
married to Augusta W., that she at the time was his wife, and that he
actually lived with her in Salt Lake City up to the time of his departure
it might be inferred that his home continued to be as such place as she made
her home in said city. Under the facts as found, and in the absence of other
findings to which we have referred, it seems to us that no presumption can
be indulged in this case . . . /ti 108 Pac 931, 934
Those fact are nothing like the facts in this case. It appearsfromthat language that the
Supreme Court would have upheld the service on the facts of the instant case. The defendant
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indeed lived in the home in with his wife in Appleton, Missouri before he began working
temporarily out of state in Amarillo, Texas and he does not deny he returned to his wife and
family at that home during regular breaks in the job. It may and should be logically inferred that he
would return to live there when the job wasfinished.Under these facts the Utah Supreme Court
in Grant would have upheld the service of process as effective.
c. The Default Judgment Should Not Be Set Aside For Want of Jurisdiction
Appellant takes a giant leap in his argument on page 18 of his brief and argues that from
the authorities previously cited in the brief and the facts of this case, the default judgment should
be set aside. In view of the previous discussion in this brief, service of process was duly made and
the judgment should not be set aside.
Appellant cites Interstate Excavating, Inc., v. Agfa Development Corporation, 611 P.2d
369 (Utah 1980). The facts of Interstate Excavating are vastly different. In that case defendant's
attorney, who had withdrawn, failed to give him notice of a hearing. Service of a notice was not
even attempted in that case. Compliance with the provisions of URCP 4 for personal service and
reasonable efforts to effect such service are not even present as considerations in the Interstate
case. In the instant case, appellant was not relying on counsel to handle his legal matters for him
and cannot argue that counsel failed to notify him of any hearing. Defendant was tending the
store himself and cannot rely on the excuse that someone else should have notified him of the
pending actions and hearings.
Appellant also cites Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor,
Inc., 544 P.2d 876 as supporting the setting aside of the judgement. Again the Westinghouse
case does not apply. It does not involve or construe as service of process. In Westinghouse, the
-12-

parties engaged in several exchanges of pleadings and discovery. In reversing the dismissal of the
trial court on defendant's motion the Supreme Court noted that the defendant had not been as
diligent in it's discovery responses and moving the case along as it could have been. The court
stated that whether there is such a justifiable excuse is to be determined by considering more
factors than merely the length of time since the suit was filed. In short the circumstances in that
case are nothing like those in this case now before the court. It is not otherwise factually in point
either.
Plaintiff recognizes defendant's argument that there is a preference in the law for trying the
issues rather than resolving matters on a procedural basis is valid under appropriate facts.
However, it does not apply in this case. There is not a preference in the law for giving a party
unlimited chances after he has ignored the processes of the court and then of necessity has to
answer to the court only when those processes catch up with him.
m. APPELLANT IS NOT PREJUDICED BY ORDER IN FAVOR OF NELDA WALL
Appellant contends that the judgment should be vacated because the order renewing the
judgement against him for the second mortgage is issued in the name of Nelda Wall the surviving
spouse of Hal E. Wall to whom the mortgage was given. In thefirstinstance if the service of
process is valid the appellant has no standing or ground to contest the judgment. His opportunity
is past. He did not contest it when he could and should have and he did not appeal within the
time forfilingan appeal. The Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain his motion. Wisdenv.
Bangerter,

P.2d

, 260 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, (1995)

In the second place, the appellant is not prejudiced or hurt by the order in that form.
While it is true that there has been no probate of Hal E. Wall's Estate, it is not true that there is
-13-

no estate of Hal E. Wall. Further the defendant did not have the courtesy or the respect of the
processes of the Court to appear timely in the action so that his obligation could be transferred
appropriately without having to go through probate and incur additional expense to collect that
money judgment toward which he had already failed to pay in even the slightest amounts. As a
practical matter the Court could have upon stipulation awarded the judgment to Nelda F. Wall,
the spouse of Hal E. Wall. Further, the Court could amend the judgment and issue it into the
name of the plaintiflf Laurel Caldwell who could assign the judgment to the Nelda F. Wall. The
practical effect would be the same as the present order. The order does nothing more than
implement the practicalities of the situation in an equitable way. Appellees informed the court
below that they would no object to the order being amended and issued into the name of Laurel
Caldwell (Currently Shields), for whose benefit it was also given in the Decree of Divorce.
Other points raised by the appellant are of little moment in the appeal and do not have
merit so as to require attention in this brief.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Laurel Caldwell tried unsuccessfully for several years to collectfromthe
defendant. Plaintiflf commenced the instant case in June 1992 and served the defendant process in
September 1992. She did not seek default until in February 1993. Process was duly served upon
the defendant by serving his wife at his residence, his usual place of abode in Apelton Missouri.
Temporary absence of the defendant from his residence for employment purposes did not change
his usual place of abode particularly where he returned regularly during breaks in the employment.
The defendant failed to file an answer and failed to take afimelyappeal after being mailed notice
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of the entry of the default judgment. The time forfilingappeal is long past and the case is res
judicata. The Court does not now have jurisdiction to entertain motions of the plaintiff.
Defendant has not shown circumstances to justify relieffromthe judgment under rule 60(b)(7).
The Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted this 11* day of August,/Mf97,

Delano S. Findlay
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